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Plaintiffs/Petitioners respectfully submit their Petition for 
a Re-Hearing of the above appeal. In so doing, Plaintiffs certify 
that the Petition is presented in good faith, and not for purposes 
of delay, and in support of such certification note that two 
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court dissented from the majority 
opinion set forth in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 
900233 (Utah April 6, 1992). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
ISSUES RAISED WITH RESPECT TO THE IMMUNITY 
OF UDOT. 
A. Decisions as to Warning Devices at Railroad Crossings Are 
Not the Exercise of a "Governmental Function''. 
As both Judge Stewart's dissenting opinion and Judge Jackson's 
concurrence in the Court of Appeals decision recognize, a decision 
on whether or not the State is immune initially hinges on whether 
or not the governmental activity constitutes the exercise of a 
governmental function. Under Standifordf the decision as to type 
of warning device at a railroad crossing is not the exercise of a 
governmental function, and no immunity exists regardless of whether 
or not such a duty is discretionary or operational. 1 
Traditionally, and in accord with a long line of Utah Supreme 
Court opinions, commencing with English v. Union Pacific Co.f 45 P. 
1
 Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp,r 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1980). 
47 (Utah 1896), the duty to place warning devices at railroad 
crossings has been borne by the railroad. Only with the passage of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15, et seq., was that responsibility assumed 
by the State, and even then, it was an obligation shared with the 
railroad, and more recently, the federal government. See, §§ 54-4-
15.3 and 56-1-11 and 45 U.S.C. §§ 433 and 434. Consistent with 
Standifordr the fact the railroad has historically assumed 
responsibilities for warning devices at railway crossings shows 
this is not the exercise of "governmental function". 
Standiford also enunciated the standards of interpretation to 
be applied in determining what is or is not a "governmental 
function". "The Act itself considerably broadens the extent of 
governmental tort liability", such that an activity is immune only 
if it "is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by 
a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity". Id. at 1232 and 1235, respectively. 
Bearing in mind the important, perhaps revolutionary, principles 
which Standiford announced, the majority's reliance upon Valasquez 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970) appears 
erroneous. 
2 
B. Even if the Exercise of a "Governmental Function". a 
Decision as to warning Devices at a Railroad Crossing Are 
Not the Exercise of a "Discretionary Function", 
In finding that UDOT's operations meet the four-step test for 
a discretionary function, as outlined in Little v. Utah State 
Division of Family Services, 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1983), the majority 
overlooks in two very important respects precisely what UDOT does 
in determining whether a crossing deserves upgraded warning 
devices. In particular, UDOT does not, in reality, exercise a 
"basic policy evaluation judgment and expertise" in prioritizing 
crossings. Instead, our record is replete with testimony and other 
evidence from members of UDOT's own surveillance teams to the 
effect that a rigid mathematical formula is applied in prioritizing 
crossings. For a more extensive discussion of UDOT's "hazard 
index, see, generally, Appellant's brief at Pages 7-9. Further, 
UDOT acts in wholesale accord with the standards established in the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, portions of which are 
appended to Union Pacific's Brief. 
It is the mechanical formula utilized in our instance which 
distinguishes UDOT's duties from those at issue in Rocky Mountain 
Thrift v. Salt Lake Cityr 789 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), as relied upon 
by the majority. The design of a drainage system is nothing like 
measuring crossing angles, train and automobile speed and 
3 
automobile and train volume, or calculating predicted accident 
rates. 
Even assuming the decision on whether to upgrade a crossing is 
the exercise of "discretionary function", the majority overlooks 
what actually occurred on our facts. Here, UDOT had re-evaluated 
the Drubey Road crossing in November of 1981, and the surveillance 
team recommended installation of automatic crossing signals. UDOT 
simply and tragically failed to implement this decision until after 
the fatal Duncan accident. As Justice Stewart so cogently 
observes, "implementation of a policy decision is an operational, 
not a discretionary, act, and, as such, is undeserving of the 
discretionary function protection". Slip Opinion at 13. Citing, 
Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1985) and, importantly, 
Bigelow v. Ingersollr 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), involving the design 
of a traffic control system. 
In view of this Court's recent pronouncements on discretionary 
function immunity, many of which involve highway or intersection 
warning signs, the majority's opinion appears to grossly overstate 
the precedential value of Valasquez. First, Valasquez predates the 
public policy considerations espoused in Standiford, that being a 
restriction of immunity and expansion of liability. While 
Standiford was admittedly not a "discretionary function" immunity 
4 
case, the policies there announced represent a departure from those 
applied in Valasquez. 
The majority's attempts to distinguish Valasquez as to the 
exercise of a "discretionary function" from the trio of subsequent 
findings in Bigelowf Bowen and Richards overlooks the Court's own 
language in the more recent opinions. Particularly noteworthy here 
is the language of the unanimous court in Richards v. Leavittf 716 
P.2d 276 (Utah 1985). As recognized by Justices Stewart and Durham 
at Page 13 but ignored by the majority at Page 6, the installation 
of warning devices at a railroad crossing are clearly not the 
exercise of a discretionary function. 
In Bigelow v. Ingersoll [citation omitted], 
where the plaintiff sued the governmental 
entity for the negligent design, construction 
and maintenance of a traffic light which 
caused their injuries, the state argued that 
the activity involved the discretionary 
function accepted from the waiver of immunity 
under U.C.A., 1953, §63-30-10(1). This quote 
supported the plaintiff's posture that that 
section did not modify the waiver of immunity 
governed by §63-30-8 and that the activities 
complained of did not involve decisions made 
at the basic plan-making level so as to render 
the state immune from suit. 
716 P.2d 278. These petitioners must, once again, respectfully 
urge that under the discretionary function analysis consistently 
applied by this Court subsequent to the outdated Valasquez holding, 
5 
the state of Utah is not immune for any negligence incident to the 
conditions created at the Drubey Road crossing. 2 
C. The Majority Does Not Address Whether Piscretionary 
Function Immunity Modifies the Waiver of Immunity under 
§ 63-3Q-8, 
An issue raised by Plaintiffs/Petitioners but not even 
addressed in the majority opinion is whether discretionary function 
immunity supersedes or can modify the wholesale immunity waiver set 
forth at 63-30-8 which provides: 
immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or 
other structure located thereon. 
As the above quote from Leavitt clearly states, discretionary 
function immunity does not affect or supplant the legislatures 
specific pronouncement that no immunity exists for dangerous road 
conditions, a phrase sufficiently broad enough to encompass 
hazardous railway crossings. 
2
 Yet another case recently rejecting discretionary function 
immunity for decisions as to railroad crossing device upgrades is 
Arm jo v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
 r 754 F. Supp. 1526 
(D.N.M. 1990) and cases at 1533. 
6 
The Supreme Court's oversight in failing to make even a 
passing reference to this seemingly "on point" statute warrants a 
rehearing and a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs. 3 
POINT II. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OVERLOOKS THE CUMULATIVE 
AFFECT OF ITS RULING AND THE REJECTION OF RECOGNIZED 
PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS IT EFFECTUATES. 
As Justices Stewart and Durham's dissent notes, the current 
"result unjustly denies recovery to the Plaintiffs in this case and 
to all future plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated". 
Slip Opinion at 18. While there are admittedly a few occasions 
where a plaintiff may be denied a recourse to the courts for 
negligently caused injuries, in general, the principle runs 
contrary to laudatory tort theories and public policy concerns such 
as compensating parties injured through no fault of their own and 
deterring hazardous conditions by holding negligent entities 
responsible for blameworthy conduct. The majority's failure to 
address, whatsoever, these important issues demands a rehearing. 
Consistent with sound policy considerations behind the 
Governmental Immunity Act, this Court's recent opinions reveal an 
evolutionary process of upholding victims rights to recover while 
holding the state liable for dangerous conditions it helps create. 
3Interestingly enough, Valasquez does cite to 63-30-8 yet it 
also fails to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the two 
sections of the governmental immunity act. 
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See, generally. Condamarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989). 
At the same time, this Court relieved railroads from 
traditional duties to answer for damages arising out of hazardous 
railroad crossings. Those facets of the majority's opinion are 
based, in part, on funding concerns. The state must exercise a 
policy decision to allocate scant resources to upgrade warning 
signals at crossings and yet Judge Halls1 decision overlooks UDOT's 
ability to require the railroad to share in those costs or perhaps 
even shoulder the entire burden. Seef UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15.3. 
Lost in all these monetary considerations are the interests of 
survivors trying to compensate for the loss of fathers, mothers, 
children and the support, both emotional and financial they 
provide. 
This powerful court has been presented with numerous, 
reasonable and well supported legal arguments which permit 
fulfilling the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence. The 
majority's decision overlooks the same. 
POINT III, 
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED A LARGE 
BODY OF LAW UPHOLDING RAILROAD'S DUTIES 
AS TO HAZARDOUS CROSSINGS REGARDLESS OF 
STATE AUTHORITY. 
Without citation to a single opinion definitively addressing 
the issue, this Court held that the authority of UDOT to determine 
8 
the type of warning device to be used at a railroad crossing 
superseded any long-standing duty of the railroad to protect the 
travelling public at a crossing. In doing so, the majority 
overlooked not only precedent from this jurisdiction but statutory 
authority as well. 
While paying lip service to English v. Southern Pacific, 
supra, Justice Hall effectively overturns numerous Utah decisions 
imposing a common law duty on a railroad to exercise reasonable and 
due care, including providing appropriate safety devices at 
crossings. See, generally, Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad, 488 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1971) and the excellent discussion of this point at 
in Justice Stewart's dissent at Slip Opinion, Page 15. As Justice 
Stewart states, there is absolutely no reason the state's duty 
precludes the railroad from having a concurrent duty. Slip Opinion 
at 16. Not only is this consistent with prior Utah authority, it 
harmonizes applicable statutes as well. Compare § 54-4-15.1 (the 
Department of Transportation shall provide for installing and 
improving of safety devices at rail crossings) with § 56-1-11 
("Railroads shall be liable for damages caused by negligence to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings.11). 
Aside from the vague and inconsistent opinion of the Court of 
Appeals in Gleave, no Utah case exists addressing the railroad's 
duty of care in the face of UDOT's authority to enhance crossing 
9 
protection. What the majority overlooked is a substantial body of 
case law from other jurisdictions. Among those jurisdictions 
upholding a railroad's common law duty of care despite pervasive 
state regulatory authority in the field of train warning signals 
are: Florida, Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. LouAllenr 479 
So. 2d 781 (Fla. App. 1985); Georgia, Southern Railway Co. v, Kraft. 
373 S.E. 2d 774 (Ga. App. 1988); Illinois, Stromquist v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc.f 444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983); Indiana, Stevens 
v. Norfolks and Western Railway Co.r 357 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1976); 
Iowa, Carl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.f 880 F.2d 68 (8th 
Cir. 1989); Montana, Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982 
(Mont. 1982); and a case construing New Jersey law, McMinn v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp.r 716 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). For a 
further discussion of these cases and in the interest of brevity, 
the Court's attention is directed to Plaintiff/Petitionerfs Brief 
at Pages 16 through 19. By contrast to the well-reasoned authority 
Petitioners cited, Defendant Railroad was largely unable to produce 
anything on this point outside the realm of federal pre-emption 
under the Federal Rail Safety Act. See Union Pacific's brief at 
Page 31. 4 
4
 As the railroad's federal pre-emption argument was not a 
basis for the majority's decision and in view of page limitations, 
no discussion thereon is contained herein. For an analysis of 
federal pre-emption, please see Petitioner's Reply Brief at Page 7 
through 10. Notably, the railroad failed to plead federal pre-
10 
One final argument the majority overlooks was the unworkable 
and unrealistic standard of care imposed on the railroad when one 
contrasts Gleave with this Court's ruling in Duncan. In Gleave, 
the Court of Appeals continued to uphold a duty of care on the part 
of the railroad to, for instance, keep their right-of-way clear of 
vegetation or other materials which might obstruct visibility. 749 
P.2d 664. Now, this Court states the railroad has no duty with 
respect to warning devices. It is respectfully submitted that 
distinguishing between warning issues and visibility issues, 
particularly in view of the duties imposed upon the railroad to 
"make and maintain good and sufficient crossings", is a standard 
difficult for trial courts and counsel to apply. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justices Stewart and Durham's well-reasoned dissent points 
out, the majority did not fully analyze the many important issues 
raised in our circumstances or has overlooked or misapprehended 
legal authority and public policy concerns. On that basis, 
Petitioners seek a rehearing of this appeal so as to enable those 
injured or killed at hazardous railway crossings recourse to the 
courts to recover damages they are justly entitled to. 
emption and consequently has waived this defense. 
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DATED this 22 e day of May, 
Michael A. Katz 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BEI 
39 Post Office Place #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Petitioners 
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